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he wrongful discharge cause of
action for at will employees, as the
leading labor law issue of the 80's,
has highlighted employer-employee relations and has been analyzed extensively. I
The attraction of the subject does not
stem solely from the number of jurisprudential issues, nor from the possibility of
socioeconomic commentary. It is also a
subject that from the practical standpoint
allows the potential for recovery of punitive damages by plaintiffs and the resultant impact upon corporate deep pockets.
The potential economic impact upon a
business as well as the enhanced power
given to employees forces consideration
by employers.
At will employment encompasses all
non-contractual workers. Based upon
19th century concepts of free enterprise,
the common law provides that employment, for an indefinite term, may be terminated by either party at will. 2 The
benefits of such an arrangement are undisputed. The very essence of business
management may require the ability of
the employer to dismiss employees at
will. Arguments can be made that an employer need not be saddled with employees
who are unable or unwilling to perform,
or who the employer finds unsatisfactory
for whatever reason. At the same time,
the at will arrangement permits termination by employees with no explanation to
the current employer. In its purest form,
the doctrine does not consider the motive
of either party. Termination may be arbitrary or with no reason at all. The wrongful discharge cause of action acknowledges
that the benefits of at will employment
may be weighted more heavily on the side
of the employer. Courts which have recognized the cause of action have restricted
the employer's absolute right to discharge
on either a public policy theory or on implied contract terms. 3

Maryland's Wrongful
Discharge
In Adler v. American Standard Corp. , 4
on questions certified from the United
States District Court for Maryland, the
court of appeals held that Maryland recognizes the cause of action of wrongful
discharge "when the motivation for the
discharge contravenes some clear mandate

of public policy." 5 The court did not proclaim that Adler was the first abrogation
of the at will employment doctrine, since
the purest form of the common law doctrine of at will employment which gave
the employer the absolute right to discharge, had previously been abrogated by
statute in Maryland. 6 Those statutes,
cited in footnote 1 of the Adler decision,
provide that an employee may not be discharged from his employment for: (1) a
worker's compensation claim filed; (2) a
Maryland Occupational Safety and Health
Act (MOSHA) report; (3) jury service; or
(4) a wage attachment under certain circumstances. 7 Although not cited in the
Adler footnote, MD. ANN. CODE art.
49B, § 16 (1979), prohibits discrimination in the discharge of employees on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin, marital status, or physical or
mental handicap unrelated to the employment. 8 Further, by statute employers may
not discharge the employee for failure to
submit to a lie detector test. 9 Of these
statutes, only the MOSHA statute and
the discrimination statute provide specific
remedies to the employee. The others
provide penalties, fines and/or imprisonment, for their violation.
The socioeconomic reality of the work
force of the 1980's is that at will employees
represent the majority of all employees.
Businesses in general are larger than they
were at the time of the creation of the at
will doctrine. Acknowledging economic
changes, the Adler court devised a very
careful balancing of interests. The court
recognized that in today's economy, an
employee cannot meet financial obligations without employment and that the
current job market is not such that one
can expect that after termination, he
would be hired immediately for another
job. Such marketplace and economic conditions add to the value of job security to
the individual; however, that interest in
job security does not outweigh the interest of business in being able to dismiss an
employee with whom there is genuine
dissatisfaction. When there is termination, the court would not substitute judicial review for business judgment in an
effort to protect the job security interest
of an individual. The only examples by
the court specifying the interests of the

employee that would outweigh the interests of the business are when the employee
has been terminated for refusal to act in an
unlawful manner or for the performance
by the employee of a statutorily prescribed
duty. The court suggests a difference
between employees who are asked by
employers to commit illegal acts and
employees who discover illegal activity
within the corporation.
The balance is between the individual
interest in job security versus the business
interest in being able to discharge any employee. The third interest that the court
considered important was the interest of
society "in ensuring that its laws and important public policies are not contravened." 10 What the court secured for the
at will employee - a cause of action, sounding in tort with the potential of punitive
damages-was very carefully limited by
cloaking it with the requirement that the
motivation for discharge must be contrary
to a "clear mandate of public policy." The
law of Adler leads to the conclusion that an
at will employee may recover for wrongful discharge, however, absent a statute to
demonstrate the mandate of public policy,
the burden of pleading such a discharge
may, in fact, be nearly impossible. Therefore, the result is that a statute may be
necessary to provide the mandate of public policy.

Allegations of Illegal
Corporate Activities
Adler, a $60,000.00 per year management employee alleged that termination
by his employer was motivated by his
previously reported suspicions of improper and possible illegal practices of the
defendant-corporation. The alleged improprieties included payment of commercial bribes and falsification of corporate
records in violation of the criminal law.
Adler alleged that such practices were
contrary to public policy; that the criminal law prohibiting fraudulent representations concerning corporate affairs expressed the public policy that prohibited
such illegal practices. II The Court dismissed the Adler complaint with leave to
amend. The failure to plead a violation of
the criminal statute, without which there
was no violation of public policy, resulted
in the dismissal. The inference is that
Fal4 J985/The Law Forum-19

when a plaintiff alleges that the motivation for his discharge was the result of his
report of some criminal activity of his
employer, to that employer, then he must
allege all the elements of the crime, including the necessary criminal intent of
his employer.
In Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corporation,12 a case similar to Adler, a vicepresident of the defendant-corporation alleged that he had been discharged because
he had reported to his superiors that there
was a possible embezzlement of corporate
funds. This discovery was made in the
course of his employment and brought to
the attention of the president and the
chief operating officer. The Illinois court
held that the employee had alleged facts
sufficient to withstand the employer's
motion to dismiss because "public policy
... favors citizen crime fighters." 13 The
difference between the. two cases stems
from the required specificity of pleading
and not significant differences between
the courts on the broad spectrum covered
by public policy.
Adler and Petrik both involved employees who learned of alleged criminal activity from their positions that gave them
access to the information while acting
within the scope of their employment.
Both cases involved management level
employees who discovered illegal activities and reported them within the corporate structure. Each employee demonstrated loyalty to at least the corporate
hierarchy when he reported the alleged
wrongdoing first within the corporation.
In effect, both employees expected to be
rewarded for venting their concerns internally before notitying outsiders. Should
either have reasonably expected rewards
for revealing knowledge of illegal acts of
superiors? It can be asked why either
plaintiff was motivated to pursue the
wrongful discharge cause of action, when
the possibility of relief was so remote.
The answer, short of vindication, probably rests with the stigma that would result from the termination by an employer
who could tell future employers that the
reason for discharge was dissatisfaction
with the employee. The result is that the
employee is not only left without a current job, but may be left without job prospects in the future.

Statutory Expressions of
Public Policy
There is no universally accepted definition of public policy. The conservative interpretation of courts in the wrongful discharge cause of action context is in terms
of legislative enactments. The most lib20- The Law ForurnJFal~ 1985

eral definition is in terms of what is in the
best interest of the general public. Although Adler appears sweeping in its protection of at will employees, the decision
is restrictive because the court requires a
clear mandate of public policy and "that
declaration of public policy is normally
the function of the legislative branch." 14
In addition, in Chekey v. BTR Realty,15
Judge Miller, applying Maryland law,
stated that "when a statutory scheme provides a remedy for injury, that statutory
scheme provides an exclusive remedy
which preempts application of general
civil common law, absent indication by
the legislature to the contrary." 16
It is suggested, therefore, that the Maryland legislature must take action to provide the court with specific statutory provisions upon which it can find a clear
mandate of public policy in situations
where an employee is privy to information which suggests possible criminal activity of the employer, without the necessity of the employee pleading the necessary
elements of the criminal violation. Other
jurisdictions have enacted such statutes,
referred to as "Whistleblowers' statutes,"
to protect employees. The purposes of
these statutes are to provide protection
and civil remedies to employees who report a violation or suspected violation of
federal, state, or local law by his employer. In addition, the statutes provide
protection for employees who participate
in hearings, investigations, legislative inquiries or court actions.
Three jurisdictions with protective employee statutes are Connecticut, Michigan
and Maine. 17 The basic similarities of the
statutes are that all three provide protection and remedies for the employee, who
on his own or through another acting on
his behalf, reports, verbally or in writing,

a violation or suspected violation of a
state, local, or federal law or regulation to
a public body. The Maine statute extends
the protection to an employee who reports
the alleged violation to the employer, as
well as a public body. It requires, however, that the employee first bring the violation to the attention of a supervisor unless the employee has "specific reason" to
believe that the employer will not remedy
the violation. The employee is not required to be certain, or be able to prove,
that the act of the employer is a violation
of the law. In Michigan, the statute requires that the employee prove by clear
and convincing evidence that "he or she
or a person acting on his or her behalf was
about to report, verbally or in writing, a
violation or a suspected violation of a law
of this state, a political subdivision of this
state, or the United States to a public
body." 18 Likewise, the Maine statute requires proof of each element by a preponderance of the evidence. The available
remedies provided in all three statutes include reinstatement, back wages, fringe
benefits, seniority, costs of litigation, attorneys' fees and in Maine and Michigan,
witness fees and injunctive relief.
The enactment of a Whistleblowers'
statute in Maryland would provide the
clear mandate of public policy sought by
the Adler Court. Adler, a management
employee, had responsibility for the analysis and accuracy of certain divisional information. Inadequacies, as well as improper and possibly illegal practices,
discovered in the course of his employment were reported to his supervisors.
Adler acted within the corporate structure
in reporting his findings. There is no suggestion that Adler ever considered reporting the possible illegal practices to anyone
outside the corporation. The Maine stat-

ute would provide a remedy to Adler since
he made the report to the employer. Adoption of a statute similar to those in Michigan and Connecticut would not provide a
remedy, since he did not report his suspicions to a public body; however, the
statute could represent the clear mandate
of public policy that is required by Adler.
Further, the Michigan statute does not require that the employee actually report
the alleged violation to a public body, but
only that his discharge occurred and he
"was about to report" the suspected violation. 19 The employee does not bear the
burden of pleading the actual violation of
law.
Arguments against enactment of a
Whistleblowers' statute include the basic
business management position that a business cannot properly or profitably operate if every employee has the right to second guess the legality and/or morality of
all management decisions. Simply stated,
an employee who thinks that his employer
is acting illegally should be so dissatisfied
that he should terminate his employment
unilaterally. Ideally, if an employee suspects that the business is not operating
legally, he should not want to be employed by that business. Realistically, financial considerations of an individual
employee may not allow him the luxury
of such idealism. At the same time, an
employee who has reported to supervisors
that he believes that illegal activities are
taking place must realize the risk that he
is taking and expect that supervisors may
question his loyalty to the employer.
The employee, however, deserves the
protection of a Whistleblowers' statute
because job security is valuable, particularly when unemployment is high. Termination may leave the employee with
depressed job prospects when his only
failing was the refusal to ignore what reasonably appeared to him to be illegal
practices of his employer. With the demand for less government, the question
arises of whether wrongful discharge or
a Whistleblowers' statute infuse unnecessary governmental interference with private industry. According to Adler, that
question is answered by the balancing of
the three interests: individual, business
and society. The interest of society in enforcement ofits criminal laws may tip the
scale in favor of the enactment of a Maryland Whistleblowers' statute.
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The dissent of Justice Brennan, with
whom Justice Marshall joined, stressed
that the delay in the search removes any
exigency that may impair reasonable efforts to obtain a warrant. Accordingly,
the dissent insisted that there lacked any
of the justifications for not adhering to
the fourteenth amendment's warrant requirement.
The Court's decision is dangerous because it shows a total disregard for that
tenuous connection between rules and their
justifications. The automobile exception
was based on narrow justifications; the
impracticality of obtaining a warrant on
something as mobile as a vehicle, the diminished expectation of privacy, and the safety
of law enforcement officers. But once a
closed container is taken from the automobile and placed in a warehouse, those justifications have evaporated. Departing from
the established justifications makes it easier
for future courts to make further unsupported extensions, which jeopardize the
fourteenth and fourth amendments' protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
In addition, by not narrowly applying
the warrant requirement, the Court runs
the risk that otherwise diligent police officers will momentarily become unobservant so that the stated focus of the
search will be the vehicle, and not the
package contained within the vehicle.
This momentary lapse removes the search
from United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1 (1977) which states that if the suspicion
is focused on the closed container, a warrant is required, and puts it within United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). This
becomes an unwise rule when it rewards
otherwise trivial differences in police surveillance by dispensing with the warrant
requirement. A better position would be to
resist the temptation to extend the automobile exception, and limit the exceptions to
the warrant requirement to those within
the ambit of the original justifications.

-Michael Burgoyne
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